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DIYANET as a TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOOL: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
NETHERLANDS and BULGARIA1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
How does Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) act as an instrument of foreign 
policy? What are the factors that allow such an instrumentalization of Islam in Turkish foreign 
policy? In addressing these questions, this article uses semi-structured expert interviews from 
Bulgaria and the Netherlands. Although both countries host a sizeable Muslim minority, these 
populations differ in their characteristics and historical ties with Turkey. Comparing Diyanet's 
role in the Netherlands with its recent Turkish Muslim diaspora, and in Bulgaria with its 
centuries-old Muslim minority allows us to reveal variation in the practical engagement 
strategies that Diyanet adopts in different country contexts. Thus, the article advances two main 
claims; first, Diyanet serves as a primary foreign policy tool of Turkey in countries with a 
significant Turkish-Muslim minority. Secondly, this instrumentalization destabilizes 
secularization projects both at home and abroad.  
Key words: Diyanet, foreign policy, state apparatus, Netherlands, Bulgaria, AKP, Turkey, 
religion 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While religion has long been a salient force in world politics, scholarly interest in the role of 
religion in international relations (IR) and foreign policy (FP) analysis was quite limited during 
the second half of the twentieth century. It was partly due to the hegemonic weight of 
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secularization theory, but prompted by the events of 9/11 and ethno-religious conflicts around 
the world, scholars are increasingly turning to the role of religion in FP (Sandal and Fox 2013). 
As the field has blossomed, scholars have been investigating a range of topics, including the 
effect of religion in peacebuilding (Gurses and Rost 2017; Gurses 2015), faith-based diplomacy 
(Marsden 2014), and the role of religion, particularly Evangelicals, in American FP (Amstutz 
2013; Inboden 2008). Secularization theorists have also predicted that, over time, political 
penetration of religious institutions could decline (Finke and Stark, 1992) but, recent 
developments signal that religions might take on institutional forms and become major players 
in politics and FP (Kalyvas 1996).  
 
Gill and Keshavarzian (1999) argue that religious institutions represent focal points that 
influence how societies, polities, and economies operate. While Ben-Porat’s (2013) Israel case 
demonstrates that religious institutions constrain secularization projects, effective roles of 
religious institutions for political mobilization show that Islamic institutions can mobilize both 
democratic and anti-Western protests in the Arab world (Wiktorowicz 2004; Stephan and Linz 
2013). While the roles of the Catholic Church in democratic transitions in Catholic countries 
were remarkable (Philpott 2004; Gill 1998), Buddhist institutions also influenced pro-
democracy movements in Thailand, Myanmar and Tibet (Cheng and Brown 2006). Therefore, 
it is difficult to ignore the role of religious institutions in FP (Warner 2000; Ammerman 2003). 
Warner and Walker (2011, 125) note that religions’ political influences on FP might be 
facilitated by transnational institutions. As a result of globalization, transnational religious 
actors and institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church, al Qaeda and Shia networks have 
various levels of power in FP (Haynes 2009). Furthermore, religious institutions can 
internationalize domestic struggles as well (James and Ozdamar 2005; Ghose and James 2005). 
Drawing on this literature, one may argue that religious institutions do not have fixed modes of 
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operation and outputs, and thus, they may have both positive and negative effects on 
secularisation processes, internal socio-political processes, and bilateral relations in FP. 
 
Philpott (2007, 518) notes that the role of state identities has provided an entry point for research 
on religious institutions’ impact on FP. Countries’ religious heritages also affect their FP 
orientation and religious institutions’ strategies (Warner and Walker 2011, 115).  What is still 
lacking, however, is a clear theoretical account of precisely how, to what extent, religious 
institutions function positively or negatively to certain FP outcomes. The co-existence of 
religion and its instrumentalization via institutions in FP is, therefore, an opportunity to ask: 
Why and how do states instrumentalize their religious institutions as a FP tool? And, in which 
circumstances do they cause positive or negative outputs? 
 
Against this backdrop, this article is concerned with the strategic use of one of Turkey’s 
religious institutions, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), as an instrument of FP 
under the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Based on 
a comparative analysis of Diyanet activities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands, the article 
advances two key claims: 1) Diyanet has been instrumentalized in a number of important 
dimensions in the new Turkish foreign policy (TFP) that reflects an Islamist identity and 
interests. 2) Diyanet’s instrumentalization has been destabilizing secularization projects both at 
home and abroad. Linked to the general research questions above, this article poses sub-
questions: a) Why and how does AKP instrumentalize Diyanet as a FP tool? b) What factors 
determine Diyanet’s scope of activity in each country case? and c) What are the effects of 
instrumentalization of Diyanet in FP for both Turkey and host countries?  
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The article begins with an overview of the evolution of laiklik and Diyanet and scrutinizes the 
transformation of both under AKP rule. Secondly, it explains of the reformulation of new TFP 
and Diyanet’s role since 2002.. Thirdly, it compares the role of Diyanet in the country cases. 
Lastly, in the conclusion part, the article claims two main points: 1) Diyanet serves as a primary 
foreign policy tool of Turkey in countries with a significant Turkish-Muslim minority. 2) this 
instrumentalization destabilizes secularization projects both at home and abroad. 
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN MODERN TURKEY: A SYNOPSIS  
Since 1937, Turkey has been defined officially as a secular (laik) state, despite having a Sunni 
Muslim-population. However, laiklik (laïcité and/or secularism) in the Turkish context is sui 
generis, it does not correspond to a secular separation of religion and state, but rather denotes 
state control (i.e. legal regulation) of religion in the public sphere. Laiklik was thus the concept 
preferred by early republican decision makers in all legislation and legal regulations. Laiklik 
was also one of the building blocks of Turkey’s modernization (Keyman 2007, 217), until the 
rise of the AKP. 
 
Since 2002, Turkey has witnessed consecutive single-party governments under the AKP, which 
has a pro-Islamic leadership cadre. Initially advancing a pro-democratic agenda, it has since 
2010 taken a clear authoritarian turn, instrumentalizing both nationalist and pro-Islamist 
rhetoric to mobilize support and smother opposition (Baser and Öztürk 2017). The new policy 
preference has influenced both the state identity and FP orientation because they are intertwined 
in Turkey’s context. AKP has also transformed Diyanet into a pliable state apparatus geared 
towards implementing the political ideology of the party. The transformation of Diyanet is not 
limited to domestic policy, but extends to the new TFP, which has acquired an ethno-religious 
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identity. Moreover, through the instrumentalization of Diyanet abroad, the AKP has been 
exporting domestic matters to the diaspora and other Muslim communities.  
 
To understand the AKP’s turn and some of the Diyanet activities both at home and abroad after 
2013, it is obligatory to mention one actor that has been effecting Turkish political life 
substantially: Gülen Movement. It is a controversial Turkey-originated transnational Islamic 
movement active in education, media and business world (Fitzgerald 2016). Gülen Movement 
seems to be an example of interfaith dialogue through the prism of civil society in global level, 
however, it also has a political face dedicated to expansion of their political and bureaucratic 
power and aiming to reach important positions within the state (Hendrick 2013). Although the 
Movement has started to place its members to the state cadres at the beginning of 1980s, their 
presence in public offices has reached its peak during the AKP period and become an unofficial 
coalition partner of the governments. Furthermore, the Movement has expanded its activities 
abroad and worked as an arm of the AKP. Yet, following political crises such as the December 
15-17 corruption scandal and the July 15 coup attempt, this unofficial coalition was dispersed. 
As a result, the government labelled Gülen Movement as Fethullah Gülen Terror Organization 
(FETÖ). Therefore, particularly in the aftermath of the coup attempt Turkey has been openly 
combating the Movement’s institutions both at home and abroad via its transnational 
institutions, such as Diyanet. 
 
One of the main pillars of laiklik is Diyanet; founded in 1924 as an administrative unit within 
the Turkish state and charged with the management of religion. In fact, its establishment 
predates the constitutional enshrinement of the doctrine of laiklik itself, which came in 1937. 
Practically speaking, Diyanet’s functions include the regulation of Sunni Islamic doctrine, 
practice, and schooling, as well as the maintenance of places of prayer. Since the late 1970s, it 
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has also been active abroad, particularly in countries with significant Turkish diasporas and 
Muslim minorities. This is also the period when the salience of Islamic identity began to 
increase in both society and the state.  
 
Due to its unique historical background and institutional structure, defining Diyanet is not easy. 
It could be defined as a religious actor, an institution or an epistemic community. Sandal (2011) 
argues that the role of religious actors in today’s political scene qualifies them as an epistemic 
community due to their expertise and status, and for that reason religious epistemic 
communities are eligible to influence the politics in a global level. The epistemic community 
approach of Sandal could be applied to Diyanet, but its character of a state institution and 
bureaucratic missions necessitate a more diversified definition. 
 
Althusser (2014) defines the state as composed of an infrastructure and a superstructure which 
takes the form of different state apparatuses of both repressive and ideological nature. The 
repressive ones are agencies under state control meant to impose the dominant ideology over 
the society by violence and coercion. The ideological ones are not directly under state control 
and instead reside within the private domain of society. Nevertheless, they still serve to 
transform the society in line with state objectives by exercising non-coercive and indirect forms 
of social control. Diyanet – strictly speaking – is neither. It is legally under state control, but 
the use of violence would be inconceivable. Yet, as specified by Ali Bardakoğlu (2004, 397-
368), a former president (between 2003-2010) of Diyanet; “it has a particular role in the 
production and transmission of religious knowledge… provides sound religious information”. 
However, Diyanet has engaged in identity and ideology construction on the one hand, for 
example by issuing fetvas (Islamic legal opinions), and forms of social control on the other, 
such as gathering intelligence for the national intelligence services.i Therefore, it stands in-
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between an ideological and repressive state apparatus. Nevertheless, it has a distinctively 
religious focus, and its characterization as a religious state apparatus seems sensible. 
Regarding Turkey’s laiklik, Zürcher (2004, 233) argues that “secularism meant not so much the 
separation of church and state as the subjugation and integration of religion into the state 
bureaucracy.” Laws introduced in 1924-25 not only laid down the basis for laiklik, but also 
deputized Diyanet as the sole locus of official Islam (Akgönül 2005) on behalf of the state, thus 
establishing its status as a religious state apparatus. To explain the role of Diyanet in laiklik, 
Gözaydın (2008, 216) claims that “the ruling elite both took religion under their control and 
managed to break the potentially sacred significance of Diyanet”. These provisions reveal that 
the founding fathers recognized the social importance of religion, and the need to compromise 
with historical-social reality inherited from the Ottomans. They were determined to control the 
influence of religion and to introduce a framework for the state that excluded religious 
justifications. Therefore, laiklik is sui generis in three ways. First, it has been an interpenetrating 
concept drawing on Western philosophy and the legacies of the Ottomans. Secondly, the state 
has been the progenitor focal point of laiklik. Finally, it was a key constituent element of state 
identity. 
Starting from late 1940s, within the multi-party system, political parties realized that religious 
rhetoric could be transformed into votes. Therefore, Diyanet gradually took control over the 
Quran courses and endowments (vakıflar) in favour of political actors. A new constitution in 
1961 recast the ideological work of Diyanet, attributing it a new mission to “enlighten” society 
about the proper conduct of religion and the moral aspects of Islam. Furthermore, between 1960 
and 1980 Diyanet became the meeting point of “official” and “unofficial” Islam. During this 
period of loosened restrictions on communal religious practice, many members of alternative 
Islamic communities such as Nakşibendi, and Nurcu found official positions in Diyanet (Bruce 
2015, 87-95). 
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Under the right-wing governments of the 1970s, Diyanet received a further boost. The Turkey 
Diyanet Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, TDV) was established in 1975 and received tax-
exempt status in 1978. It has provided crucial financial support for the activities of Diyanet 
both in Turkey and abroad ever since. In 1978, eighteen Turkish Consulates for Religious 
Services (Din Hizmetleri Müşavirliği) were established in Germany, and twenty-one Attachés 
for Religious Services (Din Hizmetleri Ataşeliği) were appointed by Diyanet at the Turkish 
embassies in Europe, the Unites States and Australia (Çıtak 2010, 611-622).  
Another breakthrough for Diyanet came with the 1982 Constitution, which embodied new 
ideological identity elements, most notably the so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Article 136 
enshrined Diyanet’s new role as a progenitor of “national unity”: “Diyanet, … shall exercise its 
duties … in accordance with the principles of laiklik, removed from all political views and 
ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity” (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
1982). Islam was to play a leading role in national unity and Diyanet was made constitutionally 
responsible in advancing that objective. Furthermore, the promotion of Turkish Islam abroad, 
especially in countries with Turkish immigrant populations, was added to Diyanet’s mission. 
Its role in the FP, however, is not limited to migrants with a Turkish background. It has emerged 
as an actor in the international arena aiming to construct and promote the new ethno-religious 
identity of Turkey. For instance, to control and regulate mosques and other religious activities 
on behalf of Diyanet, Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (Diyanet İşleri Türk 
İslam Birliği, DİTİP) was founded in Germany in 1985, where the Turkish diaspora is the most 
numerous. 
INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF DİYANET UNDER AKP RULE 
Diyanet has been among the most politicized of all administrative structures during the AKP 
period, especially since 2010. Its budget (as shown in Graph 1), administrative capacity and 
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activities have been gradually expanding. In 2011, Diyanet started issuing halal certificates, in 
2012 it opened a TV station, and its foundation, TDV, opened a university. Its fetvas and press 
statements touched upon gender issues, social media, political economy, and relations with 
social groups which reflect AKP’s political discourse. Diyanet was thus strategically employed 
in the domestic context to legitimize AKP policies via religious sanction, which had a chilling 
effect on dissent and opposition (Öztürk 2016). 
 
Graph 1: Diyanet’s budget under the AKP rule. Source; The Turkish Ministry of Finance. 
Since the early republican era TFP has been an extension of domestic politics, and this relation 
has not changed during the AKP period. Both the increasing Islamization of the AKP agenda 
and the strengthening of Diyanet have been manifested in the new TFP. During the AKP period, 
the enlargement of Diyanet’s sphere of influence is one of the indicators that political elites 
have tried to spread the identity change of the state to the society both at home and abroad. 
Therefore, Diyanet has become both a bureaucratic tool and a social actor. This reveals two 
additional points. First, the instrumentalization of Diyanet has destabilized the Turkish laiklik 
project by securing a multidimensional influence for its religious state apparatus structure. 
Secondly, overabundant transnationalization of Diyanet has made it one of the international 
symbols of Turkey with its new religious state identity. 
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TFP has traditionally hued to a realist orientation with four principles: Westernization, a 
commitment to a stable international order, adherence to law, and laiklik. According to Yavuz 
(1997, 23), “foreign relations filtered down from the secular elite’s self-ascribed European 
identity, which in turn was the basis of framing Turkish national interest”. At the beginning of 
the 1970s political Islam was strong enough to challenge the laik and Western-oriented identity 
of the state, but was not strong enough to change it. While traces of a shift may be observed 
during Turgut Özal’s period as prime minister and president (1983-1993), the paradigm shift to 
a more religious-oriented state identity has taken place primarily during AKP rule (Sözen 
2010). With ideological roots in the nationalist Islamic movement Milli Görüş (National 
Outlook), the AKP elite has used ethno-religious rhetoric in both domestic politics and in its 
FP agenda. This would be achieved by the ideational father of pan-Islamic foreign-policy 
doctrine, Ahmet Davutoğlu. He argued that Turkey could become a global power in the post-
Cold War context “as long as it followed an expansionist FP based on Islamist ideology” 
(Ozkan 2014, 119).  
His 2001 book “Strategic Depth” (Stratejik Derinlik) outlined what an ethno-religiously 
oriented TFP would look like. For Davutoğlu, identity – alongside Turkey’s geopolitical 
position – provided the country with strategic depth. A shared Ottoman-Islamic identity 
provided Turkey with a potential integrative FP capacity in its relations with countries from the 
Balkans to the Arab Gulf and beyond. Islam, according to him, is ontologically distinct from 
other civilizations, particularly the West. He characterizes the emergence of the Islamic state 
as a product of the expansion of Western international society and its nation-state domination 
into the region, especially noting the creation of “artificial” national borders after the collapse 
of the Ottomans (Davutoğlu 2001). Considering this, it is no surprise that AKP policies carved 
a space for Diyanet both as a state apparatus, but also as a religious diplomacy actor. Mehmet 
Görmez, the former President of Diyanet between 2010-2017, asserted precisely that role for 
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the organization.ii 
While President Erdoğan ousted Davutoğlu as prime minister in 2016, his TFP mentality has 
remained. One can argue that under AKP rule, Sunni Islam has replaced laiklik as one of the 
identity constituents of TFP. Prioritization of the Islamic identity has been interpreted as 
increasing soft power in TFP. Although religious soft power is acknowledged within FP, the 
change in TFP under the AKP cannot be solely explained by increasing soft power, or by a 
change in political leadership. It is the reformulation of state identity through shifting 
worldviews and discourses of the political elite. Moreover, the political elites of the AKP have 
preferred to transform the duties of the state apparatuses to implement the new TFP. In this 
regard, Diyanet is a case in point.  
To illustrate, while foreign minister, Davutoğlu spoke at a Diyanet conference of the concept 
of the “heart hinterland” (gönül coğrafyası), a reference to the global Muslim community. 
Davutoğlu charged Diyanet with structuring its role abroad with this concept in mind.iii In line 
with this vision in 2017, Görmez, defined the institution both as an international power that 
claims to be a reference point for all Muslims and as the “flotation ring” around the world.iv 
After Görmez’s sudden resignation in July 2017, Ali Erbaş, was appointed as the new president 
of Diyanet and his words in the handover ceremony were telling about  Diyanet’s global vision: 
“We have to work more than ever to deliver the eternal call of Allah and the Prophet to 
humanity, which is endangered by secularism and nihilism”.v 
Increasing prominence of Islamist discourse in TFP was also reflected in Turkey’s position on 
the Syrian issue and the problems with Israel. Yavuz (2016, 440) describes these FP stances as 
Islamist, anti-Western, adventurist, and ideological. Therefore, axial dislocation and 
employment of religion as an identity tool in the new TFP have been distinguishing themselves 
in three different ways. It was primarily constructed by domestic political evolvements of 
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AKP’s Islamism and political elites’ worldviews. Secondly, the new TFP tries to influence 
Muslim societies via both religious discourse and supporting activities. At last, Turkey has been 
positioning itself as a Muslim country in the international system. 
Given this, it is not strange that Diyanet as a religious state apparatus has been playing a 
substantial role via its transnational institutional capacity both among Muslim and non-Muslim 
societies. Diyanet has adapted itself to the new TFP and its religious identity with 61 branches 
in 36 countries. Furthermore, it has been publishing and distributing Qurans and religious books 
in 28 languages and it has been financially supporting official Muslim representative 
institutions in the Balkan Peninsula, Europe and Africa via TDV. It has been also supplying 
educational and material support for the foreign countries’ imams. During the AKP period, it 
has been building mosques around the world. Diyanet also has been organising official 
meetings such as Balkan Countries Islam Council, and Latin American Countries’ Muslim 
Summit. Taking all this into consideration, in the following sections we will demonstrate the 
strategic utilization of Diyanet in TFP under the AKP rule and the issues arising from it by 
analyzing the Dutch and the Bulgarian context in comparative perspective. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION  
Our analysis is based on data from semi-structured expert interviews conducted in Bulgaria and 
the Netherlands. The Dutch data (N=29) was collected between July 2016 and January 2017. 
The sample includes representatives of major Turkish migrant and Islamic umbrella 
organizations, including Diyanet, Milli Görüş, Süleymancılar, Gülen movement, Contact Organ 
for the Muslims and the Government (CMO), Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties 
Rijnmond (SPIOR), Euro-Mediterraan Centrum Migratie en Ontwikkeling (EMCEMO), 
Hollanda Türkiyeli İşçiler Birliği (HTIB) and Hollanda Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (HADD). 
The respondents were imams, Quran teachers, chairs of the organizations, Islamic theologians, 
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academic experts on the Turkish diaspora, and policy-makers working in the field of integration 
and radicalization. The Bulgarian data (N=28) was collected in April 2017 and the sample 
includes representatives of the Turkish state in Bulgaria, political and bureaucratic elite of 
Bulgaria, expert journalists, representatives of Gülen Movement, representatives of Bulgarian 
Muslims and other religious organizations.  
The asked questions inquired into the perceptions of key local actors about Diyanet and Turkey. 
Some questions specifically focused on the (perceived) role of Diyanet in the social and 
political lives of the Muslim and Turkish communities in both countries. Other questions asked 
about the cooperation between Diyanet and state institutions in the host countries and the public 
opinion about it. Even though the subject and many of the questions were the same in both 
countries, respondents in the Netherlands were promised confidentiality due to the political 
sensitivity of the issues related to Diyanet’ s activities in the Netherlands, while most of the 
Bulgarian informants agreed to use their names in this study; there are only four anonymous 
interviewees in the Bulgarian case. The difference in respondents’ attitude to confidentiality 
might be related to the fact that the Dutch-Turks are descendants of guest-worker migrants, and 
are still nationals of both the Netherlands and Turkey. As such, they feel more pressure 
regarding their freedom of expression around issues related to the involvement of Turkey in the 
Netherlands. Bulgarian-Turks and Muslims, on the other hand, are an indigenous minority in 
Bulgaria. They are almost exclusively only Bulgarian nationals, and thus, find themselves in a 
safer position to openly discuss politically sensitive questions.  
A comparative analysis of these two countries is interesting for several reasons. First, both the 
Bulgarian and the Dutch government adhere to an official separation of religion and state. 
Although Christianity retains cultural dominance, religion has been relatively limited in foreign 
policymaking. This is in stark contrast to current Turkish understanding. Secondly, both 
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countries host a significant number of Turkish-originated Muslims. In the Netherlands, the 
Muslim community constitutes about 6% of the total population (Berger 2014) with more than 
half originating from Turkey. Similarly, Muslims in Bulgaria who mostly self-identify as 
ethnically Turkish or Pomak make up 6% of the total population (Popov 2013), and there are 
sources that claim that this percentage might be around 12 % (Global Economy data 2013). 
Turkey has demonstrated historically a vested interest in promoting Turkish and Islamic 
identity among the Muslim minorities both in Bulgaria and in the Netherlands. In both country 
cases, but especially in the Netherlands, double citizenship additionally provides Turkey with 
a space for political claims-making over the national and religious loyalties of its citizens 
abroad.  
Furthermore, comparing the Bulgarian and the Dutch contexts allows us to differentiate 
between the FP agenda employed by Diyanet vis-à-vis “the new” and “the old” Muslims of 
Europe. Despite their similarity of size, these Muslim populations differ in their characteristics 
and historical ties with Turkey. While Dutch Muslims are mostly immigrant guest-workers and 
their descendants who settled in the country in the 70’s and 80’s, Bulgarian Muslims are 
considered indigenous minority who has been around since the Ottomans have set foot on the 
Balkans and whose migration to Bulgaria is too dated to be directly traced. Despite that, similar 
to Muslims in the neighbouring Balkan countries, the Bulgarian Muslims are often perceived 
as remnants of the Ottomans and the links between the Bulgarian Muslims and Turkey have 
been politicized both under the communist regime and after it. Turkey’s claims on its right to 
interfere into social and political affairs of the Bulgarian Muslim minority have been voiced 
stronger during the AKP period. Comparing Diyanet’s role under the influence of new TFP in 
the Netherlands with its relatively new Turkish Muslim diaspora and in Bulgaria with its 
centuries old Muslim minority allows us to uncover the similarities and differences in the 
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discursive strategies and practical involvement adopted by Diyanet in two significantly 
different contexts.  
THE NETHERLANDS: THE CONTROVERSIAL ROLE OF DIYANET IMAMS IN 
TURKISH DIASPORA’S LIFE 
Today there are 475 mosques in the Netherlands and Diyanet controls a plurality of them: 146 
mosques in total. The Dutch branch of Diyanet was established in 1982 with the aim to 
counteract the potentially divisive influence of leftist asylum-seekers and rightist members of 
alternative Islamist movements such as Milli Görüş, and to increase loyalty toward the Turkish 
state (Yükleyen 2009). In 1983, the Netherlands and Turkey signed an agreement allowing 
Turkey to send its own imams to cater to the religious needs of the growing Turkish-Muslim 
community of guest-workers (Sunier, van der Linden, and van de Bovenkamp 2016). In the 
1980s and 1990s, many Western European governments adopted the Dutch approach and 
supported the import of imams through Diyanet. Given Diyanet was controlled by a laik state, 
its vision of Islam was seen as more “moderate” and acceptable (Sunier and Landman 2015). 
Nevertheless, both in the past and now there have been critical voices warning against allowing 
a foreign state to exert influence over the lives of European Muslims (Binswanger and 
Sipahioğlu, 1988, 75). For example, one of the academic experts in our sample put it this way: 
The interesting thing is that back in the early 1990s when there was this agreement 
between Diyanet and several governments in Europe for sending imams and these 
people had special kind of work permit. At that time governments were glad about it 
because they thought, well, imams trained in Turkey, this is the kind of moderate Islam 
controlled by the state. And there was nothing about what it is now. It is a completely 
different discussion now. The governments are very much against it. They really would 
rather see the whole system wound up. 
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This is indicative of the heavy criticism in the Dutch public discourse levelled against Diyanet. 
Critics argue that it hinders the effective integration of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. It employs 
imams who do not speak Dutch and are thus unfamiliar with the Dutch social context. 
Additionally, it promotes allegiance to the Turkish state without promoting loyalty to the Dutch 
state (Sunier, van der Linden, and van de Bovenkamp 2016). Finally, Diyanet has facilitated a 
fusing of politics and religion that others have condemned. It has, for example, allowed 
propaganda of the Dutch political party DENK (founded by Dutch-Turks and Dutch-
Moroccans) in the mosques it controls. DENK is known to be close to the AKP government.vi 
Moreover, some respondents argue that Diyanet and the religious attaché have divisive 
influence on the different Turkish diaspora organizations by importing Turkey’s domestic 
problems and by imposing the official state position on migrant organizations. A representative 
of HTIB, a pioneering migrant organization for Turkish guest-workers’ rights, highlighted one 
recent example during our interview: The Turkish migrant organizations in the Netherlands had 
all been requested to join a statement against domestic violence. However, the religious attaché 
of the Turkish Embassy declared that “domestic violence does not exist in the Turkish society” 
and that “whoever engages in it is a national traitor”. Following this, all Turkish Islamic 
organizations withdrew their signatures from the statement.  
A similar dynamic has been observed in importing the domestic post-coup tensions between 
the AKP and Gülen movement to the Dutch context. The chair of a Diyanet mosque commented 
that after the coup attempt, the number of Dutch-Turkish students attending their mosque 
classes more than doubled because “before they [the Gülenists] used to divide us and now the 
citizens have become more united.” Both examples illustrate the way in which for the Turkish 
diaspora declaring national allegiance to Turkey is intertwined with demonstrating loyalty to 
its Islamic institutions such as Diyanet. Under these circumstances, one can claim that there is 
a significant change of Turkey’s and Diyanet’s perception among the Dutch society, since 
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Turkey has been instrumentalizing its religious state apparatus to propagate its new ethno-
religious identity and involving Dutch politics as well. 
Diyanet and the Training of Dutch Imams  
The change in attitude towards Diyanet and the foreign imams started in the post-9/11 context, 
when the Dutch government announced a call for subsidies for Dutch imam-training programs 
in 2004 (Johansen 2006). Leiden University, Vrije University Amsterdam and Inholland 
University of Applied Sciences received 4.2 million euro in total for establishing Dutch Islamic 
theology programs that are set up to train Islamic preachers who are familiar with the European 
context and who espouse Dutch values and norms (Ghaly 2008, 379-386). To be meaningful, 
these undertakings would have to ensure that the Islamic communities in the Netherlands agree 
to employ the students after graduation. Neither Leiden University, nor Vrije University 
Amsterdam managed to complete such agreements with the representatives of the Islamic 
communities. Although Inholland was more successful in this respect (agreements were signed 
with the two Dutch branches of Milli Görüş, the Süleymancı community, the Moroccan 
umbrella organization Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties in Nederland, and the 
Surinamese umbrella organization World Islamic Mission), notably Diyanet stayed out of all 
initiatives for Dutch imam-training programs (Meuleman, 2012, p. 233). When asked about the 
reasons for the lack of support by Diyanet, a senior executive from CMO remarked that:  
Diyanet does not want to collaborate because if they do, it would become much more 
difficult for them to bring their own imams from Turkey.  
Similarly, a high-profile representative of Milli Görüş expressed its discontent with the lack of 
cooperation by Diyanet in this respect: 
They were supposed to organize this training in collaboration with Inholland; all Islamic 
organizations would sign the agreement. Then it turned out Diyanet had not signed it. 
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Unavoidably something like that happens among us. Why does Diyanet refuse to sign? 
Because they still want to bring their own imams from Turkey! 
The lack of support by Diyanet for Dutch imam-training programs exemplifies the fact that the 
raison d'être of the Dutch Diyanet expands beyond serving the religious needs of the Turkish 
citizens. It implies that the Turkish government has vested interests in deciding who preaches 
what messages in Dutch–Turkish mosques. The evidence is clear: Diyanet’s position on imam 
training flows from Turkey’s desire to maintain its capacity to control appointments of Turkish 
imams (who are presumably accountable to Ankara) and thus to use Diyanet’s religious state 
apparatus structure transnationally. 
Imams or Religious Diplomatic Officials? 
Many of our respondents in the Netherlands were employed by the Dutch Diyanet. Before their 
placement, they go through a very competitive selection process in Ankara for the appointment 
of religious officials (imams) abroad. In our interview, a senior member of Diyanet reported 
that the annual number of Diyanet imams appointed to European mosques “varies between 500 
and 1000”. In his words, every year “between 140,000 and 130,000 Turkish religious officials 
enter the foreign placement exam” which has three parts: a written test about their Islamic 
knowledge, an oral exam testing Arabic pronunciation and presentation skills, and an interview 
with the Culture Commission comprised of officials of the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. One of the high-ranking Diyanet officials in the Netherlands described the 
questions and the objectives of the interview with the Culture Commission in the following 
way: 
For instance, they had asked us what are the Copenhagen criteria, the headquarters of 
the European Parliament, the current president, the secretary. […] They ask such 
questions also to understand whether you belong to an institution with a state tradition. 
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[…] Because you are in a foreign country, you follow the orders of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs here. And you have to be under the supervision of the Embassy and the 
Consulate. And you have to represent your state in the best possible way in the foreign 
country you are posted to. In other words, they are looking for someone who will not 
engage in controversial actions that are at odds with the state tradition. And they try to 
identify the officials who will abstain from humiliating deeds while they are 
representing the state abroad.  
Comparable to diplomatic officials, according to figures provided by a former chair of the 
Dutch Diyanet, every Diyanet imam in the Netherlands costs Turkey around €5,000 per month. 
In other words, Turkey has similar expectations and offers comparable benefits to its foreign 
affairs officials and imams employed abroad. The provision of such arrangements, which 
equate the status of diplomats and religious officials, facilitates the inclusion of religious 
rhetoric in the political conversation in the international arena. Under the new ethno-religious 
identity of the Turkish state the imams sent abroad seem to become prominent representative 
figures of Turkey in the international arena.  
 “The Long Arm of Erdogan”: Accusations of Espionage 
An extension of the debate about the political tasks given to imams at the Dutch Diyanet touches 
upon allegations of gathering intelligence. Following the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, Diyanet 
mosques have been accused of espionage against supporters of Gülen movement and other 
opponents of AKP. One of the most contested examples is the recall of Yusuf Acar, the religious 
attaché at the Turkish Embassy in The Hague and the chair of the Dutch Diyanet, from his 
position in December 2016. After leaked correspondence between Acar and the Turkish 
government, he was accused of instructing the imams in Diyanet mosques to carry out 
intelligence activities and of providing intelligence himself such as reporting the names of 
 20 
Dutch sympathizers of Gülen Movement. Among the reported names there were politicians of 
the Christian Democrat Party CDA as well. The Turkish ambassador was summoned by the 
Dutch Parliament to respond to the allegations and as a result, Acar was withdrawn from his 
position and sent back to Turkey. It is noteworthy that before his departure, Acar had confessed 
on Dutch national television that he has collected information about Gülen supporters in the 
Netherlands. He has, however, denied having instructed other imams to gather intelligence as 
well. 
The diplomatic tensions aroused by the Acar affair speak volumes about the dynamic behind 
the instrumentalization of Diyanet as a foreign policy tool. The case itself is illustrative of the 
nature of Diyanet as a religious state apparatus having a social control mechanism not only at 
home but also abroad.vii Despite Acar’s denial of the spying allegations, the publicity around 
the case indirectly serves Turkish state’s purposes by revealing to the diaspora that its actions 
are being monitored and reported to the Turkish government. In this way, both domestic conflict 
and domestic surveillance practices are exported abroad via Diyanet.  
BULGARIA: THE CHANGING FACE OF THE TURKISH BIG BROTHER  
As mentioned previously, the Bulgarian case differs from the Dutch in a number of ways. 
Süleyman Gökçe, Turkey’s Sofia Ambassador between 2013-2017, declared that “…the 
Balkans are very important for us because of its historical and democratic ties with us, but 
Bulgaria is much more important. Here, we have many kin who speak a certain language, who 
believe in a certain book. Yet, they suffered during the communist period and we have to assist 
them.” Indeed, after more than five centuries of Ottoman rule, Bulgaria gained independence 
in 1878, but the remaining Muslims and Turks were defined as “others” by the Bulgarians. They 
were mostly alienated from politics and bureaucracy. Even though some of the legal regulations 
took the religious and national identities under protection during the communist period (1946-
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1990), Bulgarian Muslims suffered due to the prohibitions of mother-tongue education, Turkish 
names, and Islamic practices.  
In this regard, one of the chancellors of the Grand Mufti’s Office in Sofia remarks that “…it 
was so sad that Turkey could not do anything for us during the communist period, but we never 
drop Turkey from our hearts...”. 
According to the current Grand Mufti, Mustafa Hadzihi, “although the Muslim denomination 
continued to exist during the communist period, none of the Grand Mufti’s were representatives 
of Bulgarian Muslims, they acted according to the Bulgarian state and they did not work for 
Turks’ and Pomaks’ rights.” Yet, after the assimilation campaign led by Todor Zhivkov, the 
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party between 1981-
1989, reinstating the rights of the Turks and Pomaks was among the first democratic acts of the 
new regime in Bulgaria. Mihail Ivanov, one of the head advisors of Zhelyu Zhelev, the first 
post-communist President of Bulgaria between 1990-1997, stated that:  
Our aim was to establish democratic Bulgaria and we knew that we have to supply 
religious service to Muslims, but we did not have money and educated staff. Our borders 
were now open and first Jordan and the Saudis realized that. This was frightening for us 
since they might radicalize our Muslims. Our expectation was to get some assistance 
from secular Turkey, but they were not strong and rich enough during the beginning of 
1990s. 
Although there was a gradual shift in the state identity of Turkey in 1990s, it was still accepted 
as a laik country. In this period, not Turkey, but Gülen Movement entered the Bulgarian field. 
According to the current representative of the Movement, during the late 1993 they started to 
support Grand Mufti’s Office financially and took control of Momchilgrad, Shumen and Ruse 
Imam Hatip high schools, but their unique position disappeared in 1998. The main reason has 
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to do with 28 February process in Turkey initiated with the military memorandum and the 
decisions issued by the Turkish military leadership on a National Security meeting on February 
28, 1997. This memorandum started the process that precipitated the resignation of the first 
Islamist prime minister of Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party. Beyond this effect, 
Turkey tried to pacify unofficial religious movements both at home and abroad. Therefore, 
Diyanet and TDV signed the first financial support agreement with the Bulgarian Grand Mufti 
to eliminate the role of Gülen Movement, but Grand Mufti Hadzihi noted that until 2003 Turkey 
could not manage to pay all the items in it.  
Islamization of Turkey’s Perception and Visibility of Diyanet 
Most Bulgarians welcomed the AKP ascendency in 2002. The Grand Mufti declared that “I was 
so sure that rationalist Erdoğan would be more beneficial for us than the other Turkish leaders”. 
Member of the Bulgarian Parliament from the Socialist Party Ivo Hristov mentioned that “to 
have a pro-EU and democratic neighbor was a dream come true for Bulgaria.” Furthermore, 
Grand Mufti Hadzihi added that: 
Starting from the beginning of the AKP period material and nonmaterial support [from 
Turkey] has been gradually increasing. Currently we are getting almost two million 
Bulgarian Lev and other material resources, there are twelve imams here right now and 
I can say that they are a locomotive for our imams who serve in more than 1100 mosques 
all over Bulgaria. These are not enough since we cannot get any support from the 
Bulgarian government due to the Constitution, but we are so lucky that we have Erdoğan 
who truly understands us.  
At this point, one might claim that although AKP’s Turkey was not perceived as an Islamist, it 
has started to use its religious state apparatus from the early periods. 
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Despite Hadzihi’s positive opinions, one of the former members of the Parliament from the pro-
minority rights party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи, 
DPS) claimed that: 
Especially after 2010, it is obvious that Erdoğan has started to use Diyanet for his 
political aims in Bulgaria. Currently, the Turkish Embassy is in the second rank and the 
real representative is Diyanet and its imams. Erdoğan has established a Muslim Turkey 
and he is an indisputable leader. It is true that Bulgarian Muslims are not that devoted 
but especially Turks have been touched by this idea. And with regards to Davutoğlu’s 
ideas even though the Bulgarian state has been underestimating them, but Turks and 
Pomaks like it. I am afraid this policy will cause many problems.  
According to same chancellor in the Grand Mufti’s office, “starting from 2010, Erdoğan’s and 
Davutoğlu’s religious discourse has started to make us happy, but just five minutes after that 
we started to ask about how it will affect us. This is Bulgaria. They [the authorities] will never 
let political Islamic discourse in here”. Thus, one might argue that AKP started to export its 
Islamic discourse abroad wherever there are significant Muslim minorities and the dramatic 
change has been perceived as troublesome by some groups. Furthermore, comparable to the 
Dutch case, since 2010 Diyanet’s representative position as a diplomatic actor has come to 
light.  
The Same Long Arm of Erdoğan in Bulgaria  
Similar to the Dutch case, late 2013 was crucial for Diyanet’s role in the relations between 
Turkey and Bulgaria. Mihail Ivanov defined that period with these words: “we managed to 
escape radical Islam in 1990s, but now, I am not sure how will we ward off Turkey’s political 
Islam.” The conflict between AKP and Gülen Movement reflected on Bulgaria directly. 
According to the representative of Gülen Movement following indirect directives of Diyanet, 
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all staff with close relations to the Movement were dismissed from Grand Mufti’s Office and 
almost all of the mosque community members took their children from Gülen-affiliated schools. 
According to a senior foreign ministry staff in Sofia; “since 2014 almost every month we have 
been getting some complaints from local political elites regarding Turkish imam activities and 
their pro-Erdoğanist discourse in mostly Blagoevgrad, Targovishte and Razgrad where Turks 
and Pomaks are a majority.” This is almost the same situation observed in the Dutch case: 
exportation of domestic conflicts via Diyanet. 
Second issue is about the Bulgarian domestic policy. Since 1990, DPS has been seen as the 
political representative of Bulgarian Turks. After the founding leader Ahmed Dogan, Lyutvi 
Mestan took the chair, but after two years he was removed by the central council and expelled 
from the party for what it considered an excessively pro-Turkish government stance following 
the downing of a Russian bomber jet by the Turkish air force. Mestan subsequently founded a 
new political force, Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance (Демократи за 
отговорност, свобода и толерантност, DOST). According to Hristov, almost everyone is 
sure that DOST was founded at the request of Erdoğan and Diyanet imams helped it set up. 
Bulgarians feel that Erdoğan’s aim is both to meddle in Bulgarian domestic politics and also 
propagate his Islamic discourse among Turks and Pomaks. By doing so, Hristov argued that 
Erdoğan has changed the perception of Turkey among Bulgarians. As a result, Bulgarians do 
not see Turkey as secular and democratic anymore. 
Related to the DOST-DPS division and parallel with the Dutch case, “the long arm of Erdoğan” 
issue took place in Bulgaria as well. The Bulgarian press reported on February 21, 2017 that 
Uğur Emiroğlu, Diyanet’s official in Bulgaria, was declared “persona non-grata” for engaging 
in activities in the religious sphere. Emiroğlu’s activities in Bulgaria were deemed 
“incompatible with his diplomatic status”, although the nature of the activities was not 
specified. According to Bulgarian press, Emiroğlu had been pressuring the Bulgarian Muslims 
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to support DOST. Although Hyusein Hafazov, vice-president of DOST declared that “all 
allegations are without any evidence and ridicules”, a senior officer in Bulgarian foreign 
ministry said that “we did not do anything without solid evidence”. 
 
Based on the Bulgarian case one may claim that Diyanet has been playing an active role in 
promoting AKP’s Islamic discourse abroad. Furthermore, as illustrated by the tensions around 
the purge of Gülenists, it has been used as an apparatus to export the domestic conflicts by using 
its material and non-material resources. At last, new TFP has stated to change Turkey’s laik 
state identity and made religion an issue to other countries’ subject matter. Alexander Oscar, 
president of one of the most visible and active religious communities in Sofia, the Jewish 
community (Shalom), highlights that “unfortunately Turkey seems to be an Islamic and 
authoritarian country now. It makes us unhappy since we have very good relations with 
Bulgarian Muslims and the Mufti, but this new situation will destroy that.” Therefore, the 
construction of Turkey’s new state identity is not related to the interaction with others. Instead 
the main driver is domestic politics and the political elite’s attitudes. The Islamization and 
authoritarianization of Erdoğan’s Turkey has been manifesting itself in FP preferences. As in 
the Dutch case, religion is both an objective and an instrument for Turkey while shaping policy 
preferences for Bulgaria.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, using the case studies of Bulgaria and the Netherlands, we have demonstrated 
the strategic instrumentalization of Diyanet in the new TFP under the AKP governments. We 
argued that this instrumentalization has been made possible thanks to the employment of a 
religious FP vision constructed on a political discourse about the binding power of religious 
identity. The analysis of the case studies shows that the growing importance of Islam in the 
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rhetoric used in domestic politics is directly reflected in the activities of the Turkish state 
abroad, leading to the evolution of Diyanet into an influential religious actor and rising the 
status of imams into religious diplomats. 
With its hegemonic position in Turkish politics, AKP has succeeded in integrating a religious 
discourse in various fields of policymaking expanding Diyanet’s sphere of influence more than 
any of its predecessors. These changes would not be feasible without replacing the laik state 
identity with a Sunni Islamic one. The promotion of Sunni Islam among Turkish and Muslim 
communities abroad has become both an objective and a means to a greater aim: The retention 
of control over these minorities and through that, socio-political influence in the host societies. 
As shown in the case of increasing number of students in Diyanet mosques in the Netherlands 
and decreasing number of students in Gülenist schools in both countries after the coup attempt, 
the rhetoric employed by Diyanet in addressing the Turkish and Muslim minorities abroad has 
been equating religious allegiance with national allegiance, combining all opponents of the 
AKP regime under the label “national traitors”.  
Comparable with Ben-Porat’s (2013) analysis of the case of the Israel’s internal politics, the 
instrumentalization of Diyanet in TFP is also indicative of the extent to which religious 
institutions can be detrimental to national secularization projects. Also, we see that it has a 
divergent destabilizing effect on the understanding of separation of church and state in the 
country cases as well. The official understanding of separation of church and state in the 
Netherlands seems to be more affected by the political claims-making of the Dutch Diyanet as 
seen in the considerations about the profile of religious actors that motivate educational policies 
and state funding for imam-training programs. Although the Bulgarian political elite is also 
wary of Diyanet’s meddling in their internal affairs, attempts to finance and control the 
Bulgarian Grand Mufti’s office by the Bulgarian state are absent. The reason behind the 
differing impact of Diyanet on the secularism of Bulgaria and the Netherlands might be related 
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to their respective pasts. During the communist regime, the identity of the Bulgarian state has 
been atheist, making all religious practices illegal. In contrast to that, despite the official 
separation of church and state in the Netherlands, all religious denominations have enjoyed 
freedom of practice and representation thanks to the Dutch pillarization system (late 1800s-
1980s) in which the society was organized around religious pillars, each pillar having its own 
media and political parties.  
Their different pasts notwithstanding, the interviews in both cases point out that Turkey’s 
abandonment of its own laik identity and the political powers it bestows upon its religious state 
apparatus led to the creation of Turkey’s new image as a not-so-moderate Islamic state. This is 
in line with the argument advanced by Philpott (2007) on the critical role played by religious 
institutions in determining state identities.  The diplomatic crises around the Turkish religious 
attachés both in Bulgaria and the Netherlands illustrate the more general resistance by European 
countries against the new religious identity of the Turkish state and FP role acquired by Diyanet. 
Particularly in the post-coup tensions between AKP and Gülen Movement abroad in which 
Diyanet was also involved, we observe what James and Ozdamar (2005) and Ghose and James 
(2005) referred to as the potential of religious institutions to internationalize domestic political 
issues.  
Further research comparing the reception of Diyanet’s branches in France, Germany, Sweden, 
Austria and USA may provide valuable insights about the role of religious institutions in FP. 
Many Western countries hosting sizeable religious or ethnic diasporas are struggling with 
finding appropriate responses to the contentious attempts for influence on their minorities from 
the countries of origin. In this respect, our findings might have implications for policymaking 
directed at regulating the rights and powers of foreign religious institutions. Last but not least, 
the findings of our study might also provide a stepping stone for scholarly work further 
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investigating the influence of religious institutions on bilateral relations between diasporas’ 
host countries and countries of origin.  
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